The Counterforce for that is study, analysis, and investigation.
However, when nations adopt a Counterforce targeting strategy, which specifically targets
nuclear assets at military installations and missile silos, nuclear deterrence is usually weakened as the incentives to strike first increase.
Mr. Clary and Mr. Narang argue,
India's adoption of potentially pre-emptive“Counterforce options”- i.e. to eliminate Pakistan's strategic
nuclear weapons when it deems the risk of a Pakistani first-strike to have crossed a critical threshold- may require no explicit shifts in its declared nuclear doctrine.
As Mr. Clary and Mr. Narang argue,
India's adoption of potentially pre-emptive“Counterforce options”- i.e. to eliminate Pakistan's strategic
nuclear weapons when it deems the risk of a Pakistani first-strike to have crossed a critical threshold- may require no explicit shifts in its declared nuclear doctrine.
The downside is that New Delhi remaining silent on this, except for occasional hints- such as what the Defence Minister tweeted recently- might compel Pakistan to adjust its nuclear posture accordingly, based on a calculation that
India might be willing to carry out a Counterforce attack and thereby eliminate the Pakistani nuclear threat entirely.
The possible threat that may appear is that the New Delhi remaining silent on this, except for occasional hints- like the one what the Defence Minister tweeted recently- might act as a driving force for Pakistan to adjust its nuclear posture accordingly, based on an assumption that
India might be willing to carry out a Counterforce attack to eliminate the Pakistani nuclear threat entirely.